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CIA Director Stansfield Turner

PRINCIPIA COLLEGE, ELSAH, ILLINOIS
ADDRESS AND Q&A

Tuesday, February 5, 1980

DIRECTOR STANSFIELD TURNER: ....Thank you, President Andrews. Thank all of you.

...I've known a lot of Principians; I've known a lot about Principia, but I'm really excited at this, my first opportunity to be here on the Elsah campus.

By coincidence, it was just three years ago this week that I received what proved to be a very fateful telephone call. I was sitting in my office in Naples, Italy when I received a call that said the President of the United States wants to see you in Washington tomorrow morning. [Laughter.] I was a classmate and friend of the President, but I'm not sure he knew where I was.

All the away across the Atlantic, I was thinking to myself what will he be asking me to undertake. Will it let me continue some of the goals, some of the ends that I hoped I could see accomplished in the United States military establishment? I did think, just passingly, that two weeks before the President's first nominee for Director of the Central Intelligence Agency had not passed through the Senate. But I rejected that out of hand and continued to think about the things I was trying to accomplish in the United States military.

Then when I entered the Oval Office and heard the President saying to me that he wanted me to take over the Central Intelligence Agency, and I had remonstrated and tried to say I would prefer to stay in my military profession, and I heard him continuing to say "No, the Central Intelligence

Agency...." You run out of argumentation with the President quickly.

Sort of across a screen, I saw flashing 32 years of naval experience going, going, and standing before me was a stark, new challenge.

I mention this to you because many of you will be facing a new challenge this summer when you graduate. Others of you are already thinking ahead a year and a half to what you're going to do for your first challenge in the working community. And I would suggest that, as happened in my experience, what will happen to you is you'll make a very important decision when you leave this college and you embark in one career or one profession, one field of endeavor. But don't think you'll be making that decision just once. You'll make it over and over again. And no one set of preparations, no one set of skills will be adequate to prepare you for the kinds of opportunities that may come your way.

I would suggest there are three particular preparations that will be very helpful to you in adapting to new opportunities that may come your way. One is to have defined your objectives in your working life. Another is to have established your work habits. And still a third is to have understood the ethical standards in which you will conduct your working lives.

I was fortunate when I made the shift from a military career to a career as an intelligence officer. My objectives did not have to change, because my objective has been to serve this country. Now I don't say that to try to sound altruistic. I joined the Navy when it was popular to serve your country during World War II. But my objective was not immediately thereafter to continue to serve. It wasn't until I'd been in eight, nine years and I felt the enthusiasm, the stimulus, the sense of reward of being part of our national security apparatus that I became dedicated to serving my country as long as they had use for me in the government service.

But I would suggest to you that you need to define your objectives as you go along and watch them so that when new opportunities do offer themselves, you know whether they lead you in the direction you ultimately want to go or in some other way.

And as far as work habits were concerned, as I rose progressively in the Navy, I found that my work habits continued to increase. My capacity, the time I was willing to devote to my work reached the point that where I became the Director of Central Intelligence, I couldn't imagine that there was more

that could be asked for or demanded of me. But there was. And somehow I found the time and effort to do more.

I would suggest again to you that you must decide as you go along "Can you, and do you want to be able to expand your work habits as you rise in seniority and in importance?" And this is not just a question of capability. This is a question of the quality of life that you seek, because I would further suggest that most top businessmen, most top government officials in our country work too hard. And you have to make a judgment as you go along of the boundary of your sense of ambition and objective and your sense of the quality of life that you want to lead. But you should make it consciously; you should think about it.

As for ethical standards, I also was very grateful that my military career had prepared me quite precisely for the kinds of things I have faced on the ethical scene in intelligence. A military man must look and ask himself "Does the golden rule always apply? Does it apply equally to your country's enemies, be they countries or individuals representing those countries, or do you treat them differently? And if so, how differently and with what limits?" You have to ask yourself "Are American ideals worth fighting for, killing for?" Similarly, as Director of Central Intelligence, I have to ask myself what risks should we take for our country? How important is it that we gain pertinent information?

And similarly, I would suggest to you that you need to lay a foundation early in your working careers as to what ethical standards are going to be the foundation with which you will approach the problems of your career or your profession as you proceed through it, because you need to be prepared when the time comes.

I'm sorry to have digressed on to ethics and work habits, objectives. What I really want to share with you tonight is a little of the feeling of what it was like after I left the Oval Office and what it's been like in the three years since to be the Director of Central Intelligence, the head of the Central Intelligence Agency of our country, and in this particular time, because I think it's been a very special time in the intelligence history of our country.

One thing that perhaps unfortunately being the Director of Central Intelligence is not like is James Bond's 007. I said unfortunately. My wife's sitting in the 5th row here, very fortunately. [Laughter.] I don't have any exotic traits of James Bond. If there is a similarity between the DCI -- I'm sorry. We from Washington always have to talk in acronyms. I'm the Director of Central Intelligence, the DCI. If there's a similarity between 007 and the DCI, it's in the kind of gad-

getry we use. Now mine isn't rear firing guns, blades that stick up from the hubcaps on a Mazaratti. [Laughter.] But mine is exotic satellites, photographic equipment, listening devices that hear the signals that are going through this room right now, pick up radars, radios, all kinds of electronic emissions. And the United States is very blessed because we have the scientific expertise and ingenuity in this country that gives us the very best of intelligence collecting devices.

Technical intelligence collection, which is what we call collection through electronics wizardry and such, has one interesting characteristic. Generally speaking, a photograph tells you something that happened in the past. The intercept of a radar tells you that yesterday at that place, on that frequency, with that power, a radar was operating. But when an intelligence officer presents that to his political policy-making masters, they say "But Stan, why did that happen? And what does it mean is going to happen next?" So I want to find what people's motives are, why they're doing things, and what they are planning. What do you turn to? You turn to the human spy, the agent who can talk with people, who can probe their minds and come back with these thoughts which are intentions and plans.

So, yes, today we have to have spies, and we do. We're very good at it. But here too, perhaps fortunately, my role is not like James Bond in the spy world. My decisions are not ones -- "Do I jump out of the airplane without a parachute?" They're not that straightforward. They're not as clearly right or wrong when all is said and done. He either gets to the ground or he doesn't. I sometimes never know whether my spy decisions are right or wrong, because the essence of spying is risk-taking. And each time we have to judge whether the risks -- I'm sorry -- whether the benefits are going to be worth the risks, because there are risks. There are risks, for instance, of embarrassing the country if you get caught spying where you should not be caught. There are risks of vastly complicating our diplomacy. And by far not the least, there are risks to human lives when you make decisions and conduct spying activities.

And so I must ask myself the question: how valuable is the information? Will it really do something to help the President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and so forth. And could we obtain it in any less risky way? And the answer to that usually is yes, we might. They will come to me and they will say "Yes, with much less risk, you might have a 30% probability of getting what you want." Now do I take that 30% chance, particularly if, in taking it, I foreclose the higher risk, but high probability option, because maybe there won't be time?

Then there's the question of what ethical limits will we go to to obtain the information. Is there some floor below which we will not go? And very importantly, do the ethical standards that apply vary with the quality and the importance of the information that you are likely to obtain? Are there missions I would do to obtain information that would prevent World War III that I would not do that would tell us about Soviet intentions to enter the grain market and cheat us, almost, as they did in 1972?

There're no formulas. There're no set rules for these kinds of tough decisions and judgments. And it's that ethical foundation that determines what you will do, why and at what cost. It's a very intellectual, a very thoughtful process to manage a spying organization, not an adventuresome, derring-do one.

Now collecting information, either by these technical systems, like the satellites, or by the human spy is only one-half of the intelligence business. Once you have the information, you've got to do something with it. You've got to interpret it; you've got to analyze it; you've got to study it and come up with some kind of an estimate that will help the policy-maker in making his decision based on that information. Now this is a very intellectual enterprise. It's very much like your sitting down to write a term paper, or like a research department of a major corporation, or research on the university or college campus.

At this particular time in our country's history, it is particularly interesting to be involved in this analytic process in the world of intelligence. For the first thirty years or so after World War II, our intelligence focused very largely on the Soviet military threat, and well it might. But today, for instance, this afternoon, for instance, we are closer to being in economic warfare with the Soviets than we are in military warfare. And today, around the world, political and military -- I'm sorry -- political and economic considerations are very important to our country. We must put more emphasis on them than we have in the past. And although the Soviet Union remains our number one priority intelligence target, and always will, I believe, look this evening at where we are concerned about impending crises in the world. In Southeast Asia, the Vietnamese have invaded Kampuchea. They're pushing nextdoor to where it may spill over into our friendly country, Thailand. Look at the elections which are pending in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. Look at the possibility of a near revolution in Mexico or El Salvador. Look at how we've studied the quirks of a 79-year old Shiite cleric in Iran, and nextdoor the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the threat to India and Pakistan.

These are all non-Soviet Union areas of the world, largely in what can be called the Third World, and this is growing in importance to us also. And so we have difficult, but interesting choices to make today in trying to decide where to put our efforts. And in particular, we're trying to look ahead and say to ourselves, "Well, will the great needs of 1985 and 1990 be the same kinds of crises that we're facing today, or will they be generically quite different? Will we be more concerned in that period of this decade with food to feed the growing population of the world, with the proliferation of nuclear weapons in small countries or even terrorists, or just to terrorism itself, or to international narcotic trafficking?" And therefore we in the world of intelligence must be asking ourselves every day "Are we developing today the right satellites, the right listening posts, the right kinds of spies to collect information on these problems that we'll face tomorrow and which may not be the same as today? Are we developing the right analytic skills and talents, the languages and academic skills that will be necessary to analyze this kind of information? It's an exciting and demanding challenge, and it's hard to look ahead in that way.

There're two other facets of being the Director of Central Intelligence, the head of the CIA, that I'd like to describe to you very briefly, because they are public responsibilities, my responsibility to the American public as a whole and to the Congress, in particular.

You, of course, are part of the American public, and I'm here tonight because we do give speeches, we do join in symposia, we do try, even though our business is very largely secretive and to share as much as we can with the American public. And we do that because the foundation stone of our way of government is that the people know as much about that government as is possible, so that they can make good decisions about it and so they can lend support to it where it deserves it. And we need that support, and, therefore, we need to illuminate for the American public where we can.

A key means of that communication with the public, of course, is through the media. And this is a very exacting, demanding and time consuming element of my work. When you go before the television cameras, when you go for an interview before the press, you have to be very careful, very cautious, very well prepared. You have to choose your words very carefully because you may over-commit the administration to something that it's not committed to; you may give an impression to foreign countries and individuals that is not warranted if you are not exacting and precise in your language. And it's time consuming also because the relationship between

anyone in government and anyone in the media is fundamentally an adversarial relationship, and you have to be cautious and on your guard. The media wants to get out of you more information than you are normally willing to share, particularly those of us who have large secrets at our disposal.

But that's a good relationship and it should be adversarial. I'm not complaining, though I would suggest that since Watergate I believe that relationship has become more adversarial than it's healthy for our country.

The relationship I have with Congress as a responsibility is part adversarial, is part cooperative. Mainly it is new. The amount of interchange with the Congress involving the intelligence community and the appropriate congressional committee is, today, just vastly greater than it has ever been in the history of our country. It also is a very time consuming requirement for me.

There are, for instance, two Foreign Affairs Committees and two Armed Services Committees, and all of whom want to, need to, deserve to be up-to-date on what is going on around the world as they make their decisions for our country. There are two budget committees; there are two appropriations committees, and all four of them want to know why we need the money that we ask for. And in addition, and just in the last few years, and most significantly, there are now the two Oversight Committees dedicated only to supervising the intelligence function of our country. These committees, in particular, give us guidance, sometimes in law; sometimes in advice. And in the process, they, in effect, are sharing our responsibility for what we are doing in intelligence.

They are also your surrogates. Because we cannot reveal everything that needs to be seen in order to conduct oversight of the intelligence process of our country to the public, we review what we cannot give to the public to these congressional committees, and they act for the public as a surrogate in seeing, on the one hand, we are properly and fully utilizing the authority that we have, and, on the other hand, that we are not abusing the restrictions that are placed on us by the Congress or by the President.

All of this opens a tremendously difficult question of the compatibility of secrecy and intelligence and openness in a democratic society. Today, this country is involved in a bold experiment in finding a balance between secrecy and openness. We are being more open to the public than any intelligence organization in the history has ever been. We are being more closely cooperative with the Congress than ever before. And we have had spelled out for us by the Congress and the executive over the last few years more strict regulations

on what we can and cannot do than have ever been legislated for intelligence bodies before.

Today, I say to you we are trying to achieve a balance. We are not sure that this mix of regulation and openness is exactly what it should be. I believe we are moving in the right direction. On the one hand, we've run the risk of inteligence by temerity. If because so many people are looking over your shoulder you are afraid to take risks, then we will have no intelligence at all. If because so many people are exposed to our inner secrets, those secrets leak and our allies and our agents around the world do not have confidence in us, then we will have no intelligence at all. If because you have to clear your action through so many bureaucratic processes you have no flexibility, you cannot act quickly in a crisis, we will not be up to the task.

So interestingly, just a few days ago, the President of the United States, in his State of the Union Address to the Congress, asked them for two things. The first was for charters, as he called them, for the intelligence community. These are legal codifications of rules under which we would operate. They would consist of three parts: the authorizations of what we can and should do; the restrictions on what we cannot do; and then the oversight process by which you balance the two.

At the same time, the President asked for a relaxation of some of these restrictions that have been placed upon us. And I think the fact that he could and did ask for them and received a strong round of applause from the Congress indicates how far we have come since the period of 1976-'76 when there were the investigations of the intelligence process of our country. Those investigations did uncover some abuses, not as many as the media would have you think. But you know that the country reacted by enacting these restrictions which the President is now, in some cases, asking to have eased; not removed, but eased somewhat. And the fact that the Congress did applaud such suggestions indicates that they, because of the way the President has gone about the relationship between intelligence and the Congress, have developed confidence in us. And because of the way the President has set up the oversight procedures within the White House, he has confidence in us.

And so what we are asking and suggesting today in the debate which will go on in the Congress for the next few months is that we need to balance explicit restrictions, which, when they're put into law by the Congress, are very rigid and you just can't anticipate all the kinds of circumstances in which they may hamper you, with generalized restrictions that

are overseen by these committees of the Congress to tell whether you are taking undue advantage of the generalizations rather than following a very specific law or rule that it sets forth.

I think, too, the applause from the Congress to the State of the Union Address indicates a greater recognition in the Congress and throughout the country of the very need and importance of having good intelligence for our country and for its policy-makers today. Our reponsibilities are vast as a country, not only to our own people, but to all the people of the world, especially the people of the Free World. And it is increasingly important that we have the information base so that our decision-makers can make the very best decisions possible for us and for others.

So today, we are in the midsts of a very exciting experiment in adapting this intelligence process to a democratic society while we retain the ability and opportunity to be effective in what we do.

[End of Side 1, Tape #1.]

DIRECTOR TURNER: ...hopoes and aspirations, and, of course, to expand my horizons and to take up this new opportunity. And I encourage you as you look forward to leaving Principia one day to think ahead, to recognize that you want to be prepared for new and challenging opportunities all through your working life.

Thank you very much.

[Applause.]

I'd be pleased perhaps to respond to your questions or to hear your comments or suggestions. The front row, please.

Q: [Inaudible.]

DIRECTOR TURNER: How do I estimate the strength and weaknesses of Soviet intelligence?

As I intimated in my remarks, they're a world behind us in the means of collecting intelligence and data by technical systems. We are better in all categories.

Different people would give you different estimates on who's ahead in the spying department. They are bigger than we. I think we're more clever, but I'm biased.

[Laughter.]

We do have a very effective spying department. And I've emphasized it a great deal to you tonight. We do have ethical limits on what they will do. But I would not trade positions with the head of the KGB.

[Applause.]

The other half of intelligence is analysis. And there is no question in my mind that a free society where questions, where challenging assumptions is the standard practice, where you come to a college like this to learn how to dialogue, how to debate, how to look at things from differing points of view, as contrasted with a closed society where you could lose your job and your head if you disagree at the wrong time and the wrong place, that we must have much greater strength in the analytical field.

So while they're more mischievous, while they're less ethical, we're the best.

Q: [Inaudible.]

DIRECTOR TURNER: Yes. There is nothing in the character of the American Embassy representation in Tehran that is different than in any embassy of the United States or any country, virtually, around the world.

[Laughter and applause.]

The point is there is no basis for singling out those people or that embassy for the kind of illegal, inhumane treatment that they have subjected them to.

Yes.

Q: [Inaudible.]

DIRECTOR TURNER: Is the kind of operation that causes the downfall of governments still part of our bag of tricks?

Yes. That is called covert action. I did not cover it in my remarks. Technically, it really isn't part of intelligence. But the country has assigned to the Central Intelligence Agency, one of many intelligence agencies, the role of conducting covert action whenever it has been so decreed by the government.

Covert action is defined as the effort to influence events in another country without the source of the influencing being known. That could involve overthrowing governments. It could involve influencing public opinion. It could involve influencing the opinion of decision-makers in those countries,

and so on. There're lots of different forms that it can take, even up to paramilitary operations to affect the balance of power.

Part of the increasing structure of oversight and regulation that I was describing to you, one which is very important, has been in this field of covert action. And today, we in the Central Intelligence Agency do not originate these. The policy-makers tell us that they have a problem in a certain country, a certain area, and what could we do to help. We come back with suggestions. They must then be approved by the National Security Council, signed by the President of the United States, and I must then notify eight of these committees of the Congress of our intentions and plans.

What I'm emphasizing is that if the country decides to overthrow somebody or influence the policy-makers in some country, it is not an intelligence agency's decision to do so: it is a very explicit decision of the country and its decision-making apparatus. And one of the reliefs that the President is asking today is to reduce from eight committees of the Congress to two, the two Intelligence Oversight Committees, the number that we will have to notify. We have had some instances in which there were more people in the Congress who knew what we were doing than in the Central Intelligence Agency. And it is not that the Congress is any more leaky than anyone else. But you just can't look a man in the eye and say take a risk for your country, stick your neck and your life on the line; I'm just getting ready to go up on the Hill and tell 200 people.

So we are trying to reduce that so that there is oversight, there is congressional awareness of what we are doing, but that it is more limited and structured.

Q: [Inaudible.]

DIRECTOR TURNER: Is there anything that we can do in the case of Sakharov, any influence we can exert?

This is an internal matter for the Soviet Union, of course. It's a reprehensible one. And one thing we can do through covert propaganda, but more importantly through virtually overt propaganda, is to focus, and to continue to focus, the attention of the world on this kind of inhumane treatment that they use for people like Sakharov. But don't go with any thought or suggestion of trying to intervene in the internal affairs of a country here. Of course you are aware of some of the previous cases where there have been swaps of dissidents or spies, and somebody like this could become involved in that.

Yes, sir?

Q: [Inaudible.]

DIRECTOR TURNER: No. The biggest surprise, supposedly the biggest intelligence failure, so-called, was Iran. It's difficult to explain without appearing to be apologetic or trying to make excuses. The important issue in a situation like that came to a head in Iran just a year ago is whether the intelligence community was advising the policy-makers over a considerable period of time that these problems existed and could erupt into that kind of situation. And that we were doing. I think we probably could have done it better, but we were not unaware that there were lots of problems in the Shah's country.

Predicting an actual eruption, be it a coup, assassination, an unusual election result is always much more difficult. And it's really much less important. You can't change United States' policy two weeks before the coup happens and have much effect. But you can two years ahead of the time if you see the thing moving in a particularly ominous direction. Now what we frankly did not catch in Iran a year ago last October/November was the potential of a 79-year old cleric, who'd been out of the country for 16 years, to be a coalescing factor behind which all of the ferment which we were reporting would come together and be greater than the Shah thought he could handle with the considerable army and police forces that he had.

So we did not predict that. But clearly we were not surprised that a problem arose and turned in that direction.

Q: [Inaudible.]

DIRECTOR TURNER: I think you're asking, do we have an effective policy on Afghanistan....?

If I answer that question too clearly, I may get fired -- [Laughter] -- not because we don't have a good policy on Afghanistan, but because it's not an intelligence officer's province to comment or to suggest policy. Now the reason for this is that we are supposed to be sort of the neutral purveyors of information, and we do not want it to appear that we are slanting the information to support policy "A" or policy "B." And hopefully in the decision-making councils, like the National Security Council, I'm the fellow who is supposed to stand up and tell the Emperor he doesn't have any clothes on; that is, to be willing to say your policy has, you know, these flaws; that if you were to carry out that policy, these things may flow from it. If you carry out this policy, these other things may flow from it, and not take an advocacy position for one or the other.

But to answer your question a little bit rather than just evade it on this ground, let me say it is my personal opinion it's obviously going to be very difficult to get the Soviet troops out of Afghanistan, even though they may not be able to accomplish what they wanted to. And all the reports that I've received indicate things are going very badly for them in Iran and in Afghanistan at the moment. The Afghan population is very Moslem; it's very tribal, and the communist governments since that which was installed by coup in April of '78 have flaunted the tribal autonomy and have flaunted the religious preferences of the country. And on top of that, the Soviets have been the traditional enemies of Afganistan, and they are really very impolite. They have tremendous military force. They could certainly apply more and more of it there if they want to. I'm not saying that the Afghan insurgents can hold forever. I had a big debate the other day as to whether we should continue calling them insurgents or freedom fighters. I think "freedom fighters" is probably better, but....

Any way, the one thing I believe that will work to hopefully deprive the Soviet goal on Afghanistan is to continue the international awarness of Russian troops today, of the cynicism, the illegality of what they did. You know, first they went in because President Amin was about to be toppled by the CIA. Then they went in, they said, to topple Amin because Amin was a CIA agent. And they've got so crossed up with their argumentation now that it is really almost humorous. And we must keep the world's attention focused on that.

Yes.

Q: [Inaudible.]

DIRECTOR TURNER: What role does energy have in our national security?

Well, it's much broader than our energy. But the energy problem for our country will not go away even if we suddenly found the gushing oil wells to produce the 18 million barrels a day that we consume, because the Japanese the Europeans are vitally dependent upon the Middle East for their energy resources. And today the world is poised on a precipice with respect to energy supply. It is our analysis that there may be enough to go along for another year or two without too big a hitch. But that's probably only because the economies of the world are slowing down, and we don't want that. And any kind of a ferment or revolution in some modest sized oil producing country, if it just, you know, interrupted production for six months, would put us to where there is a greater demand for oil than could possibly be supplied. We're already in a position today where, in 1980, the Free World

will have available less oil than it did in 1979. Now that's a startling point, because for over a decade, it isn't a question of ever having the same this year as last; it's always been more. The idea of going down is something entirely new to us. And our growth, our industrial growth has been built on this constantly rising consumption of oil energy. And as long as we, the Europeans, the Japanese are this dependent -- and it will be many years before you get by with a combination of conservation and substitutes that can turn this around so that that demand will really decline, where the leverage of the Middle East is much less on Europe, Japan, and even ourselves.

As long as that's the case, it could well mean the status of the countries in the Middle East is just going to be a fundamental ingredient of our foreign policy.

Q: [Inaudible.]

DIRECTOR TURNER: To what extent do foreign intelligence agencies work in this country, and is the CIA interested in that?

I'll have to refer you to my good friend and compatriot, Bill Webster, who's the head of the FBI, because that is his concern, expressly not mine, because we do not want to be involved in looking into things involving Americans in this country, or turn into, and are prohibited from so doing. There are operations where we assist the FBI, but it's the FBI's responsibility to do what we call counter-intelligence, looking into the activities of other intelligence organizations inside the United States. I do that outside the United States.

The communist bloc countries are very active and they put in a considerable effort. You've heard of the microwave intercept program in Washington, San Francisco and New York. And we know the Soviets have conducted this, and we've taken defensive countermeasures against it. But it's typical of the extent they will go to, and it is a very meaningful problem.

Q: [Inaudible.]

DIRECTOR TURNER: Is the SALT II treaty verifiable given the loss of monitoring stations in Iran?

This is one of the more complex issues that I've had to grapple with in the last year, and it's in line with my remark to the other question regarding policy. We've had to cut a very fine line between saying whether this treaty is verifiable or not, because if you say it is, you could be accused of taking a position in favor of the treaty, and therefore the

objectivity of my analysis of our ability to monitor the treaty may be questioned if I become an advocate, in appearance even, for the treaty.

I've taken a consistent position, and I've told the Congress, the President of course, precisely what we could do and could not do. It is up to them to make the qualitative judgment, "Is that adequate to the security of our country?," because you'd have to then add in things like "What is the alternative to this? Or what are the alternatives to this?" And, you know, we will never have a hundred percent perfect monitoring capability. So you know, how far down the scale you can come and it is still not too risky for the United States, the benefits are still greater than the risks is a judgment that should not be made by an intelligence official.

STAT

Q: [Inaudible.]

DIRECTOR TURNER: Well, I'm sure it's a surprise to the Director of the FBI, because he's in for super trouble. I can't talk about myself.

Seriously, I have emphasized a lot tonight the ethical issues that come up. And I put it in ethical terms because I think it's an ethical problem, not particularly a religious problem. But what I'm saying is that, you know, of course my ethics come from Christian Science. Somebody else approaches his ethics through other perfectly fine ways. There're different ways of getting there.

So really I hope and believe that I use my religion in coming to the kinds of judgments that I come to. But I certainly don't, in any way, say that means you have to have a Christian Scientist in the job by any means whatsoever. I think it's just very fortuitous for me that the Director of the FBI not only happens to be a co-religionist, but we belonged to the [word unintelligible] organization together in 1941 and '42. And so we've been long-time friends. And the relationship between the FBI and the CIA was good when I arrived. But it's even better today, and it's very important to the country that it be better. We will work on that. We work hard at it both on a personal and official basis.

Q: [Inaudible.]

DIRECTOR TURNER: Did you all hear that? [Laughter.]

What are -- how important is language, culture, fundamental understanding of a country and its mores and attitudes to doing the intelligence on it, and in particular the question of the Soviet Union?

It's very important. And it's becoming more important because of the points I mentioned early on that it isn't just the Soviet military issue that is important to us today. That is very important still, but there're so many other problems that have to be addressed. And problems of revolution in Iran, problems of unrest in other important friendly countries have to be addressed from the issue of understanding the religious, the ethnic, the cultural and many other factors that go into shaping that society. I mean so many of us have become experts of the Shi-ite religion in the last six months or more. You know, I mean we just have to have more of that.

One of the great challenges to us in the intelligence world is to train people to be the analyst for country "X" with language "Y," culture "Z" when maybe nobody is going to ask them questions about country "X" for five more years. You didn't hear much about Libya or Zimbabwe or Mali or some of the countries that we're much involved in today, you know, five or ten years ago. We have to develop that kind of expertise, challenge and stimulate people to be experts in these areas, even though there isn't a great demand for them today, because we must have that reservoir for tomorrow. You don't develop this kind of expertise you're suggesting overnight.

For the Soviet Union, of course, it exists in greater degrees than elsewhere. But I am quite concerned that the drop-off in Soviet studies on campuses across our country and the lessening of institutes and other organizations that are working on this, working with emigres and refugees. We need very much, obviously, to really understand the Soviet mentality, because there will be a very divided set of events taking place in the Soviet Union in the next few years. Their economy is going down, the rate of growth. They're going to have severe economic problems. Part of it is due to their own energy problem. We believe this year they will peak in their energy production and start downward. Part of it is due to the demographic problem. They have fewer young men and women in their manual labor force, and in past two years the rate of growth is markedly down.

Part of it is that they cannot increase their productivity factor. It is going down. Another part of it is that there is an impending leadership change in the Soviet

Union. So I can only say it's most important we understand and define those factors that are likely to come up.

Yes, please, in the back row.

Q: [Inaudible.]

DIRECTOR TURNER: Why did the Soviets go into Afghanistan with all these -- if they had all these problems? Is it part of a plan, and are they looking for oil and other things?

My personal view is that they went in not quite out of desperation, but out of a recognition that if they did not, the Amin regime, Prime Minister Amin, was floundering and was likely to have been overthrown. And with the exception of Chile, that would have been the only time a Marxist regime had been internally overthrown. And this was right on their borders; the people on the Russian side of the border being ethnically the same or similar to the people on the Afghanistan side.

Secondly, I believe they underestimated the reaction that they'd receive from our country and the rest of the world. I think they felt that this was their sphere of influence; they'd had a communist government there for a year and a half, and that we just hadn't recovered from Vietnam enough to be very concerned about this kind of a place that was so far away. I think they just underestimated this. And we now have a very delicate situation in front of us because, as I mentioned, it won't be easy for them to just pick up and retreat. But they are in an extremely difficult position.

[End of Side II, Tape #1.]

Q: [Inaudible.]

DIRECTOR TURNER: How damaging was the information given by two young men named Boyce and Lee, who sold information from a U. S. contractor, the people who make the gadgets that I described to you, and turned it over to the Soviet mission in Mexico City?

It was quite damaging. We spend billions of dollars -- and I said billions -- to develop, manufacture, loft up these satellites. They can't be completely countered by something like that, but their usefulness can be considerably reduced, and you and I as taxpayers will have to spend a lot more money to find something else to change them, or whatever. And that was costly.

We have, in a word, tightened up security at the industrial entity. We have tightened security within the government. But the leaking out of classified information is still probably the most dangerous problem that faces the intelligence community of our country today. And it is one of the reasons that the President has asked for a relaxation of the Freedom of Information Act. For instance today, I was sued by a British newspaper for failing to answer their Freedom of Information Act request for a month. And I like the British. But I mean I've got 104 people full-time on my payroll answering Americans' and others' Freedom of Information Act requests. And I only supply a very small fraction of the information that is requested, because the rest of it is very highly classified. So I'm spending 104 man years to produce maybe a man year's worth of data. And I have to do it not only to the British who are friends, but I had one the other day from the Polish Embassy in Washington. And that's ridiculous. [Laughter.] And if the KGB wrote me, I would be required by law within ten days to respond.

[Laughter and applause.]

[End of Q&A session.]